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Abstract—Bitcoin is a “crypto currency”, a decentralized elec-
tronic payment scheme based on cryptography. Bitcoin economy
grows at an incredibly fast rate and is now worth some 10 billions
of dollars. Bitcoin mining is an activity which consists of creating
(minting) the new coins which are later put into circulation.
Miners spend electricity on solving cryptographic puzzles and
they are also gatekeepers which validate bitcoin transactions of
other people. Miners are expected to be honest and have some
incentives to behave well. However. In this paper we look at
the miner strategies with particular attention paid to subversive
and dishonest strategies or those which could put bitcoin and its
reputation in danger. We study in details several recent attacks in
which dishonest miners obtain a higher reward than their relative
contribution to the network. In particular we revisit the concept
of block withholding attacks and propose a new concrete and
practical block withholding attack which we show to maximize
the advantage gained by rogue miners.
RECENT EVENTS: It seems that our attack was executed
in practice against Eligius mining pool, see Section XI-A.
Keywords: electronic payment, crypto currencies, bitcoin,
bitcoin mining, mining pools, game theory
I. INTRODUCTION
Bitcoin digital currency [18] is not properly speaking a
currency. It is first of all an electronic payment system based on
cryptography. The fact that in cryptography we call it a “crypto
currency” or “e-money” does not mean that it has to have all
the attributes of money, or it should work as a replacement
of traditional fiat currencies. On the contrary. Bitcoin is rather
an emerging technology ecosystem and a social experiment,
which is still largely under development. A paper at the
Financial Cryptography 2012 conference explains that Bitcoin
is a system which uses no fancy cryptography, and is by no
means perfect [3]. Bitcoin is a sort of financial anarchy. A
self-governing open-source crypto co-operative which initially
concerned only a few enthusiasts. However in 2013 the press
and the media have popularized bitcoin and given it some
serious attention. In April 2013 the Economist have explained
that bitcoin is certainly is one of the things which are going
to shape the future of finance and payment [11] and famously
compared bitcoin to digital gold. Since this moment the market
price of bitcoin has increased nearly 8 times with a particularly
rapid increase at the end of 2013.
A. Bitcoin As A Distributed System
Bitcoin is a decentralized peer-to-peer system with a net-
work of open-source software nodes [17]. The network is
run by the interested participants: people who use it to make
payments between themselves. As such it requires no trusted
parties such as traditional financial institutions. Bitcoin is
build with the idea that – maybe– we do not need trust and
good reputation. Neither we would need regulation, legislation,
supervision, policing of fraud etc. All the things which are
absolutely necessary for the traditional financial institutions to
function. Instead bitcoin takes a truly and radically different
approach. It is an attempt to build a financial infrastructure
based on entirely new premises. A sort of peer-to-peer financial
anarchy run by people who trust no one.
B. The Cryptographers’ Dream
The main proposition is something which we frequently see
in cryptography. We call it a cryptographer’s dream: a dream
about the world which functions with participants which do
not see each other, do not trust each other a lot, and yet are
able to somewhat function and achieve some sort of “secure
function” or prevent fraud from being committed. An attempt
to build systems which remove the necessity of having trusted
parties such as financial institutions and other businesses,
intermediaries, or providers of services. Or at the very least,
to greatly decrease the trust assumptions which are necessary.
However finance and payment is not an idealized cryptography
world. Here the possibility of building such systems is quite
surprising, disturbing and needs yet to be demonstrated.
The current bitcoin ecosystem remains excessively frag-
ile: there is essentially one software distribution [17] which
implements a “full network node”, and which is the critical
infrastructure necessary for bitcoin to function. This software
is certainly a critical point of failure [7]. More importantly,
not all participants in the bitcoin network are the same.
C. Critical Nodes: Miners
In fact only very few of the full network nodes are so called
miners. These miners do two very important things which are
very closely related:
1) First of all they actively participate in approving
and verifying the correctness of bitcoin transactions.
Ordinary network participants do not need to per-
form these checks except maybe for the very few
transactions in which they are personally involved.
However miners are expected to check the correctness
of transactions and approve them. Collectively miners
generate a consensus which is a sort of official bitcoin
history (also known as the Main Chain) which
allows to prevent fraud such as double spending.
2) More importantly miners are people who manufacture
(mint) the currency: they spend a lot of computing
power on solving a specific type of cryptographic
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puzzles (cf. [8]) and in exchange they cash rewards
in the form of freshly created coins. They also have
an additional source of income which comes from the
fees on all the transactions they have approved.
The solutions to these cryptographic puzzles are made public
and are an essential part of the official public ledger of all
bitcoin transactions ever made. These solutions are called
bitcoin blocks. Miners spend money on purchasing equipment
for bitcoin mining and on electricity. The equipment for bitcoin
mining has with time become increasingly sophisticated and
nowadays mining is done with highly specialized computing
devices known as ASIC miners which exist only for this
purpose, cf. [8]. This is clearly a violation of the original idea
of bitcoin by Satoshi Nakamoto, who very clearly postulated
that each node should be collecting recent transactions and
trying to create new blocks in the currency, cf. Section 5 of
[18]. However such specialized devices allow to create bitcoins
while using as little as 10,000 times less energy than with
ordinary PCs, cf. [8].
The two activities of the miners are very closely related.
The implicit assumption is that miners who approve transac-
tions “honestly” or as expected by the designers of this digital
currency [18] will have in principle higher chances to reap the
rewards which are the precisely the incentive for miners to
support the digital currency. This is in principle, as in practice
we are going to show that sometimes miners will deviate from
the ideal behavior for profit, and that there will not suffer
from a penalty of any kind. Moreover we will show that such
behavior can remain totally invisible and sometimes it simply
cannot be detected, not even in theory.
It is possible to take a view that what bitcoin really is,
is just a (somewhat decentralized) high-tech business venture,
run by a group of people (miners) which make money from
this activity. As such miners have vested interests and do not
necessarily represent the interest of the majority of network
nodes. Bitcoin is simply not (or not yet) this sort of decentral-
ized utopia network which belongs to no one and works for
everybody, which sometimes it claims to be. We need to stop
claiming that bitcoin is an utopia which it never was, and see
it as a game with multiple participants with their interests.
D. Big Uncertainties
Bitcoin is an attempt to build a system able to carry
out simple financial transactions such as payment for goods
and services over large distances (for example in the digital
economy). However this attempt is imperfect and fragile. The
software specification of bitcoin is not written in stone and it
is likely to evolve. This possibly in very strange directions dic-
tated by minorities such as some miners. Bitcoin cryptography
is likely to be just broken in the long run. The design could
also be subverted. The creator of bitcoin is an anonymous
person or group and no well-known authority in cryptography
or information security have certified that bitcoin is in some
sense secure.
There is no such thing as a free self-governing space.
Sooner or later some sort of bitcoin governance must emerge.
In contrast with the bitcoin software developers which are well-
known public figures and whom we tend to trust [17], miners
are an obscure group of anonymous people organized in a
handful of groups or pools such as BTC Guild, ASIC Miner,
GHash.IO, etc.. cf. [22], [23]. In most cases we don’t even
know in which country they reside. Moreover they tend to
hide for tax evasion reasons: billions of dollars of (potential
or/and realized) profits have been made by miners in the recent
years. Most of these profits remain invisible to tax authorities.
A great majority of bitcoin users use pseudonyms and their
real identity is unknown.
In this paper we study the question of miner strategies.
What miners can do to increase their already very substantial
revenue. In particular we focus on subversive strategies how-
ever strange and farfetched they may appear. We point out that
miners are subjected to grat many moral hazards which in the
long run they might not be able to resist. We also postulate
that these questions should be discussed openly if we want the
security of digital currencies to improve.
II. SHORT DESCRIPTION OF HOW BITCOIN WORKS
It would be controversial to say that there exists such a
thing as a unique and authoritative bitcoin specification. This
would be somewhat contrary to the spirit of bitcoin. The
original paper contains very few actual details and as we have
already seen it is not always followed in the bitcoin practice.
However at this moment in history, we have essentially one
dominant form of bitcoin software [17] and the following web
page claims to contain the primary official bitcoin specification
[20]. However the bitcoin specification is not written in stone.
In reality the bitcoin specification is in a constant flux and
bitcoin is officially claimed to be experimental rather than
mature. This software changes with time and in spite of
being open source it is very obscure. It uses scripts and rich
in functionality libraries such as OpenSSL which imply the
possibility to easily extend their functionality in the future in
maybe unexpected ways. Other independent code bases are
emerging, and in the future there is no guarantee that there
will be an universal agreement on what bitcoin is and what it
should be. These questions could just be decided by consensus.
Various authors describe bitcoin to a certain extent and they
usually omit many essential details. There are many common
misconceptions about bitcoin in the press: for example we
frequently hear that bitcoins are encrypted. In fact bitcoin
can function entirely without any encryption. It is all about
integrity and authenticity of transactions. These goals are
achieved through digital signatures and cryptographic hash
functions.
In one sense the whole of bitcoin is just a sort of distributed
electronic notary system which works by consensus and with
peer-to-peer payment as the main practical application. Below
we provide a short, concise description of how bitcoin works
for the purpose of this paper.
1) We have a decentralized network of full bitcoin nodes
which resembles a random graph. Network nodes can
join and leave the network at any moment.
2) A public ledger of all transactions is maintained and it
is used to record payments with units called bitcoins.
3) Bitcoins are divisible and are in great simplification
like digital objects stored on the computers of the
network participants.
4) Initially, when bitcoins are created, they are attributed
to any network node willing and able to spend
sufficient computing power on solving difficult cryp-
tographic puzzles.
5) It can be seen as a sort of lottery. Currently 25 BTC
are attributed to just one winner every 10 minutes on
average (however this quantity decreases with time).
We ignore the question of how exactly the difficulty
is adjusted to achieve that and related attacks, see [2]
6) Miners repeatedly produce a double SHA-256 hash
H2 of a certain data structure called a block header
which is a combination of events in the recent bitcoin
history and which process is described in details in
[8].
7) This H2 must be such that when written as an integer
in binary it will have some 64 or more leading zeros.
8) More precisely, in order to produce a winning block,
the miner has to generate a block header such that its
double SHA-256 hash H2 is smaller than a certain
number called target.
9) This can be seen as essentially a repeated experiment
where H2 is chosen at random. The chances of
winning in the lottery are very small and proportional
to one’s computing power multiplied by 2−64. This
probability decreases with time as more miners join
the network and the difficulty to find one block
increases.
10) If several miners complete the winning computation
only one of them will be a winner which is decided
later by a sort of majority vote. This problematic
situation is called a fork and currently happens less
than 1 % of the time, see Table I on page 7.
11) Existing portions of the currency are defined either as
outputs of a block mining event (creation) or as out-
puts of past transactions (redistribution of bitcoins).
12) The ownership of any portion of the currency is
achieved through digital signatures.
13) Each existing quantity of bitcoin identifies its owner
by specifying his public key or its hash.
14) Only the owner of the corresponding private key has
the power to transfer this given quantity of bitcoins
to other participants.
15) Coins are divisible and transactions are multi-input
and multi-output.
16) Each transaction mixes several existing quantities of
bitcoins and re-distributes the sum of these quantities
of bitcoin to several recipients in an arbitrary way.
17) The difference between the sum inputs and the sum
of all output amounts is the transaction fee. It belongs
to one winning miner who have managed to include
this transaction is his block.
18) Each transaction is approved by all the owners of
each input quantity of bitcoins with a separate digital
signature approving the transfer of these moneys to
the new owners.
19) The correctness of these digital signatures is checked
by miners.
20) Exactly one miner approves each transaction. How-
ever blocks form a chain and other miners will later
approve this block, and at this moment they should
also check all the signatures.
21) All this however is effective only for blocks which
are in the dominating branch of bitcoin history (a.k.a.
the Main Chain). Until now great majority of events
in the bitcoin history made it to become the part of
this official history.
22) In theory every bitcoin transaction could later be
invalidated. The common solution to this problem is
to wait for a small multiple of 10 minutes and hope
that nobody will spend additional effort just in order
to invalidate one transaction. Moreover even if there
is a fork, we can hope that everyone was honest, and
our transaction will be included in both versions of
the history.
23) In practice the problematic wasted effort which does
not become the part of the official history and
could lead to invalidation of past transactions remains
marginal. It represents less than 1 % of the total
computational effort, see Table I. This is because
the propagation in the bitcoin network is quite fast:
the median time until a node receives a block is 6.5
seconds whereas the average time is 12.6 seconds,
see [9], [10]. However after 40 seconds there still are
5% of nodes that have not yet received the block.
24) Overall the network is expected to police itself, min-
ers not following the protocol risk that their blocks
will be later rejected by the majority of other network
participants. Such miners would simply not get the
reward for which they work.
III. HOW POOLS WORK
In this section we describe very briefly how pools work
and define the concept of a “share”.
1) The main reason why miners mine in pools is the
reduction of the uncertainty: people want to have
regular income and they do not want to play the
lottery.
2) Miners in one pool mine with the public key of
the pool manager which cashes the gains and re-
distributes them according to their contribution in the
join effort.
3) If miners find a block which hashes to a value which
starts with many zeros, for example 32 zeros, they
send such value to the pool manager.
4) This is a proof of effort worth 232 attempts of
computing the double hash of Thm. 3 and which can
be easily checked by the pool manager.
5) We call such a contribution a share.
6) Miners send their shares to the pool manager as soon
as they find them.
7) The process of computing a share is the same process
as the process of computing a valid block however the
difficulty level is lower. Some of these shares have a
hash which has more than 32 zeros, for example 64
or more zeros.
8) Such winning shares are with high probability com-
puted by just one miner, cf. Table I, and with high
probability they will form a new valid block for the
bitcoin network.
9) A winning share allows the pool manager obtain
approximately 25 BTC at the present moment, cf. [8]
for more details. This money is distributed among the
pool participants.
IV. ON STATISTICAL APPROXIMATION OF THE BITCOIN
MINING PROCESS
In this section we assume that a mining pool is a static
union of miners who have put together their computing power
and share rewards more or less uniformly, cf. [22], [23], [24],
[25]. We basically consider an arbitrary fixed subset of bitcoin
mining devices.
A. On Repeated Events
Bitcoin mining is based on hash functions the output
of which is expected to behave essentially as independent
random variables. Repeated events are governed by the laws
of statistics such as the Law of Large Numbers and more
precisely we have the following well-known result:
Theorem 1 (Central Limit Theorem): Let {X1, . . . , Xn}
be a sequence of independent and identically distributed
random variables each of which having the expected value µ
and finite variance σ2. Then
lim
n→∞Pr(
n∑
i=1
Xi − nµ
√
n · σ ≤ z) = Φ(z),
where Φ(z) is the probability that a standard normal variable
is less than z.
Informally and for the purpose of this paper, for any
event which is repeated many times, whatever is the actual
probability distribution, if we repeat the experiment n times for
a large n and add the outcomes Xi, the resulting variable has
a standard deviation of approx.
√
n times the original standard
deviation σ. Moreover any larger or smaller deviation will be
subject to the Gauss error function and large deviations will be
extremely unlikely, for example the probability to be outside
of 8 standard deviations is as small as 2−50, cf. [19].
In Theorem 1 the number of events n is assumed to be
very large. However it can be also applied (indirectly) to the
analysis of rare events such as bitcoin mining events which
can be shown to be a by-product of a very large number of
more basic events.
B. On Rare Events and Bitcoin Mining
It is easy to show that the following result holds approxi-
mately (but not exactly!) for any group of mining devices and
therefore also for any fixed group of miners and therefore for
mining pools with a static set of members.
Theorem 2 (The Law Of Bitcoin Mining): If in any given
period of time a group of miners has the computing power
which allows it to mine K blocks in expectation, then the
standard deviation of the number it will actually mine will
be approximately
√
K, following the Poisson distribution.
Moreover following Thm. 1 the probability that we will be
at a certain number of standard deviations will be governed
by the Gauss error function.
Proof 1: In order to obtain this result we need to assume that
at any given moment in history, the probability for a pool to
mine the block is constant, and it does not depend on previous
events (no memory). This is only an approximation as pool
members leave and join, the difficulty to mine a block is
variable, and also the hash power of the competition in the
bitcoin network fluctuates slightly. Then we have the classical
case of a Poisson process in which the mean is equal to its
variance 1, and therefore the standard deviation is the square
root of the mean which is
√
K, cf. [21], [24], [25], [6].
Proof 2: Here is an independent derivation and a specific ex-
ample rooted in the bitcoin mining. It is made to be as realistic
as possible and very close to what is actually happening in the
bitcoin network. It is the based on the well-known property
that the Binomial distribution converges toward the Poisson
distribution.
We consider that there are many miners trying to mine
a block in a mining pool. Miners of variable size will be
modeled as combinations of several miners Xi of equal size,
which makes that n is quite large. We have Xi = 1 if a given
miner (or a unit of all available computing power) finds the
winning block. Most of the time Xi = 0. More precisely each
miner will be modeled as a combination of mini miners each of
which evaluates the double compression function of Theorem
3 just once in one unit of time (here we ignore the cost of this
process and possible speed-ups). Let assume that by definition
the winning block computes a hash which has exactly 64 zeros,
which is close to the reality. Thus in approximation, in a pool
which has produced say K blocks in a period of time, there
were n = K · 264 trials. We have n independent random
variables Xi with mean of µ = 2−64 each. They Xi are equal
to one if and only if one of the hashes tried has succeeded to
produce a winning block with 64 zeros. It is straightforward
to compute the variance of each of these variables:
σ2 = (1− µ)2µ+ (0− µ)2(1− µ) = µ− µ2 ≈ µ.
Now for X1 + . . . + Xn and since all the trials are
independent the variance will be nσ2 ≈ nµ = K. Then
however the standard deviation is equal to its square root which
is
√
K.
Remark 1: Needless to say, in the real life this analysis is
just an approximation, valid if the network power is distributed
uniformly in time and if the difficulty if constant.
Remark 2: When we apply Theorem 2 in practice we
frequently need to make another approximation. We do not
know what exactly was the computing power of one pool, we
can just estimate it from the number of blocks mined.
V. BASIC ATTACK STRATEGIES FOR SUBVERSIVE
MINERS
The research in the area of miner strategies have evolved
from simple attacks with large majority towards less obvious
attacks which operate in more discreet ways. It this paper
we describe a number of attacks in which the basic strategic
objective is to assure some group of malicious miners a
certain unfair advantage, for example to obtain an expected
revenue from mining higher than their fair share based on the
contributed computing power.
1This distribution is sometimes called the Law of Small Numbers from a
title of an old classical book [6] which has popularized the Poisson distribution
as a tool which models quite well various sorts of real-life events.
A. The Pool Hopping Attack
The “Pool Hopping Attack” is described in [24], [25]. The
main idea in this attack is that if a miner mines in a pool in
which a lot of shares have already been submitted and no block
has yet been found, he will gain less in expectation because the
reward will be shared with the miners who have contributed to
this pool. Therefore at a certain moment it may be profitable to
stop mining in this pool and contribute elsewhere. This remains
valid even if the pools penalize leavers and refuse to pay for
their contribution if they do not mine for a complete “shift”. It
is still profitable for miners to quit and mine for another pool
(or mine independently).
This attack works more or less well depending on how
exactly pools are managed and also depending on the actions
of other miners, cf. [24], [25]. It can be shown that hoppers will
earn more than normal “continuous” miners. Various reward
and pool management methods have been proposed in order
to discourage pool hopping and some reward methods can be
shown to be immune to this attack, we refer to [24], [25] for
more details.
In this paper we assume that miners do not change pools
frequently and that in the long run, whatever is the reward
method, they are paid in approximately in proportion to their
contribution.
B. The Mining Cartel Attack
The “Mining Cartel Attack” is described in [16]. It is an
attack in which a large fraction of miners such as 50% decide
to ignore some or all blocks generated by miners which are
not members of the cartel. This allows dishonest miners to
achieve higher gains.
C. A Difficulty Raising Attack
In this recent attack a powerful attacker is secretly prepar-
ing an alternative version of the blockchain. At the same time
he is manipulating the automatic difficulty adjustment mech-
anism in his secret chain in order to increase the probability
of eventually that his chain will be recognized as surpassing
the public honest chain. If this happens, the attacker reveals
his secret chain. This can be used to commit double-spending.
See [2] for more details.
VI. CONFIDENTIAL CRYPTOGRAPHIC OPTIMIZATION
ATTACK
This is a new attack and is based on the idea that miners
can improve and optimize the mining process. We refer to
[8] for the historical evolution of bitcoin mining and how
the power consumption of bitcoin mining have evolved due
to the technology shift from all purpose to specialized silicon
devices which are designed and made just for the purpose of
bitcoin mining. If we assume that same silicon technology is
achievable for all miners sooner or later, there is also a space
for algorithmic improvements which will be an additional
source of competitive advantage. A recent paper shows that
the mining process can be improved by some 38 % by
cryptographic optimization [8]. This is not negligible knowing
that literally megawatt hours of energy are spent on bitcoin
mining [15]. Here is the main result:
Theorem 3 (Cryptographic Optimization of Bitcoin Mining):
The amortized average cost of trying one set of data to see
if the double hash of it with SHA-256 has 64 or more
leading zeros is only at most about 1.86 computations of the
compression function of SHA-256 instead of 3.0 in naive
version. This represents an improvement by 38%.
Fig. 1. The process of bitcoin mining according to [8].
Proof: We decompose the double application of SHA-256
which is the essence of bitcoin mining into 3 applications
of the SHA-256 compression function (cf. Fig. 1) in which
many individual pieces of data can be pre-computed and are
essentially constants over many computations, or change in an
incremental easy to predict way. Moreover some of the final
computations can also be omitted as the result is incorrect most
of the time and we can have early rejection with incomplete
data. A complete proof is given in [8].
Application: Is there a place for subversive strategies here?
Yes. There is only a handful of cryptologists who are able
to improve the core process of bitcoin mining. Paying these
people to develop confidential improvements which will ben-
efit only one group of miners, not the majority of miners is
certainly an obvious subversive strategy. However since the
publication of [8] the playing ground has been somewhat
leveled. It is possible to believe the figure of 1.86 is close to
the theoretical limits and that further gains from this strategy
can no longer be very substantial, maybe just 1 or 2 %. This
is not yet the most disturbing subversive strategy for miners
we can think of.
VII. SELFISH MINING ATTACK
At the end of 2013 almost all the newspapers have written
about one particular paper about bitcoin by Cornell researchers
Eyal and Sirer [12] with a title: Majority is not Enough: Bitcoin
Mining is Vulnerable. This paper is basically a game theory
paper which shows that in the current bitcoin currency systems
miners have a particular sort of subversive strategy, a version
of which was in fact also independently invented and studied
by Bahack cf. Section VIII below.
This strategy is called Selfish Mining in [12] and it is
also studied as strategy st1 which is one of Block Discarding
Attack(s) studied in [2]. The attack consists of information
concealing in a very selective and special way, and revealing
it just in time, also in a selective way. It is very much counter-
intuitive as it seems that bitcoin is based on self-interest, and
that the first interest of the miner is to have his part of the
effort disclosed as soon as possible, in order to be used by
other miners in the mining community. This is because only
then the efforts of the miner will be paid for: the miner obtains
bitcoins and will be able to pay for his hardware and electricity
expenses spent on solving the cryptographic puzzles. However
in the subversive strategy miners are trying to confuse other
miners to also waste their efforts and this in higher proportion
than themselves.
It is a surprising and highly technical proposition which
nobody yet understands fully. It appears that there exists a
strategy for miners in which miners sometimes voluntarily do
not publish their results as soon as they find them, and rather
delay this publication by which process they waste some of
their computational effort and put themselves at risk of not
getting the reward. However at they same time they also create
some confusion in the network which makes other miners to
waste even more effort (in proportion). It is entirely about
making other miners to try to mine on blocks such that their
effort is likely to be lost, because another branch of the bitcoin
network exists and is kept confidential. This for a relatively
short time, in order to minimize losses and maximize the gain.
This is quite surprising and counter-intuitive. However it is
shown in [12] that subversive miners can obtain rewards which
are in proportion (maybe only slightly) bigger that their share
of computing power.
Here is a simplified (incomplete) description of the selfish
attack. Our intention is to show how this attack looks like in
practice, what are the guiding assumptions which command it,
and to see which events are expected to be the most frequent.
1) Assumption 1. Most of the time subversive miners
behave like normal miners. If there is a single longest
chain in the public blockchain, all miners try to
extend it. In absence of a fork, and in absence of “se-
cret” blocks which some miners keep for themselves,
the most likely winner block is the same for everyone.
This “consensus” situation will be very frequent. Here
subversive miners have no particular advantage.
2) If the selfish miners find a new block (B1) first, they
do not publish it instantly, and share it only inside
the selfish pool. We say that selfish miners now lead
by 1 step.
3) The number of possible situations is greatly reduced
by the following assumption: Assumption 2: At
any moment during the attack there are up to two
competitive public branches one of which can have
a secret extension. We have either just one branch
(with possibly a secret extension by the attackers) or
a public fork with two branches of equal depth k ≥ 0.
In the case of a fork one branch is composed solely
of honest miner’s blocks and the other is composed
solely of attacker’s blocks which at moments can have
a secret extension.
On page 4 of [2] it is claimed that this assumption
can be made for all “interesting” strategies for the
subversive miners and that other strategies are sub-
optimal.
4) Concealing a block (or more) leads to different views.
Honest miners will be mining 1 (and rarely more)
steps behind the selfish miners. The effort of honest
miners during this time is likely to be wasted, we call
this property (R1).
5) The effort of subversive miners could also be wasted
if secret block(s) are kept secret for too long. There
is a risk is that some secret block(s) would never be
used. We call this property (R2).
6) For this reason the block is kept secret only for a
short time.
Further detailed rules of the attack have been de-
signed in such a way in order to maximize the gain
from (R1) and minimize the losses from (R2).
7) We assume that the subversive miners lead by 1 block
(B1). Most of the time honest miners will also find an
equivalent block and destroy the lead of 1 block. We
call such events (C1). Sometimes the lead increases
which we call (C2).
8) When (C1) the subversive miners instantly reveal
their secret block and create a public fork. Now the
subversive miners do not lead, however they have
started mining on their secret block (B1) earlier.
9) During a fork situation selfish miners mine on their
branch (B1), while honest miners mine on both
branches depending on the network propagation.
Interestingly the selfish miners want other honest
miners to also mine on the same block (B1): this
block costed a lot to produce and the risk of not being
paid for this block is very high (due to the fork). This
is the main event when subversive miners could lose
from (R2).
10) Going back to the initial situation before a fork with
1 secret block, we have the less frequent possibility
(C2) that subversive miners extend their secret chain
by yet another block (leading now by 2 or more
blocks). Then they keep mining on their secret branch
as long as the lead is 2 or more and they publish
some blocks from the secret branch each time the
honest miners find a new block on their branch. The
honest miners may then or not switch to their branch
and they are permanently exposed to (R1). However
subversive miners avoid making the lead become 1.
This happens however with high probability due to
the actions of the honest miners. Then the selfish
miners publish all their blocks in order to convince
the honest miners to definitely switch to their branch
due to Assumption 1 above and achieve the initial
“consensus” state. We should note that situations with
lead 2 or higher are not very frequent.
Overall the strategy is very complex and it is not obvious
to see if and when it is profitable, see [12].
A. Discussion of the Selfish Mining Attack
Assuming that the main result of [12] is correct (it was
confirmed by computer simulations) we are at present moment
not at all convinced by the claims of this paper. On the
contrary we believe that the claims of this paper ar exaggerated
and only valid in a certain context. The reasons for this are:
1) One cannot claim that “Bitcoin is broken” just be-
cause some subversive strategy exists. Other even
better strategies with higher expected gain may exist.
2) The paper [12] makes one very explicit assumption
which potentially invalidates the overall result. On
page 5 we read: For simplicity, and without loss of
generality, we assume that miners are divided into
two groups, a colluding minority pool that follows
the selfish mining strategy, and a majority that follows
the honest mining strategy (others). However there is
no reason to assume that if there is a subversive
strategy, there will be only one group following
it. On the contrary. Because the current proposal is
about secrecy (concealing information which should
not leak outside of one group), it is very strange
to assume that there will be only one such group.
It is not clear at all that the effect of several such
groups would be the same or that such groups will
have incentives to merge into one group. Several
competing subversive groups of equal size might be
competing against each other and this will probably
invalidate or decrease the benefits of each other’s
strategy.
3) For large pools it may become infeasible to keep
secrets from others. In [2] it is claimed that such an
attack is rather applicable to solo miners.
4) There is no evidence that miners actually mine on the
first block they receive as claimed in [12]. Though
the bitcoin source code is open [17], the code of
miners is nowadays in great majority closed and we
simply don’t know how advanced it is and what
improvements or optimizations (cf. Thm. 3) have
already been made.
5) Each strategy has adoption thresholds. Gains need
to be demonstrated to be substantial or they will
not make any difference. It is simply not correct to
assume that miners will switch to a certain strategy
or join a certain pool if the benefits are just 0.01 %
in theoretical mathematical expectation of gain. This
knowing that gains are not evenly distributed, have
a large variance and therefore small benefits are just
not visible to small participants. It will be in fact
difficult to convince people that gains are real. Larger
participants may of course optimize their operations
with utmost scientific precision and care, however
one of the claims of the paper [12] is that even very
small groups of participants (without a lower limit on
their market share) would be interested in adopting a
subversive strategy or/and would be compelled to join
a growing group of “selfish miners”. This is simply
not true.
6) Even if miners would in theory join some sort of
subversive pool as claimed in [12], they could deviate
from the expected “honest” behavior inside that pool.
For example members of the pool can apply an attack
we describe later in Section IX in which a sub-group
of miners works against the pool and all the other
miners and achieve higher gain than others.
7) There is another technical argument which will be
presented later when we are going to comment on
the historical data in Table I and view the possible
advantage to be gained as possibly only a small
proportion of an already small proportion of “wasted”
computational effort.
In this paper we do not attempt to solve this problem of
what is the best strategy for bitcoin mining neither we claim
that this problem is solvable. We just point out that the problem
of selfish behavior is immaterial as of now. We have analysed
the historical data of blocks which have been wasted in the
bitcoin network for the whole history of this network. In Table
I we present the results knowing that the timing of the bitcoin
network is one block published every 10 minutes. The table
covers the whole bitcoin history since the system has started
to function in early 2009.
TABLE I. PERCENTAGE OF BLOCKS EVER MINED WASTED DUE TO A
FORK AND WASTED BLOCKS WHICH ARE CHILDREN OF WASTED BLOCKS
blocks wasted child(wasted)
less than 140, 000 0.00% 0.00%
140,000-149,999 0.21% 0.00%
150,000-159,999 0.27% 0.01%
160,000-169,999 1.01% 0.01%
170,000-179,999 1.77% 0.29%
180,000-189,999 1.71% 0.01%
190,000-199,999 1.15% 0.01%
200,000-209,999 0.88% 0.00%
210,000-219,999 1.05% 0.00%
220,000-229,999 1.28% 0.42%
230,000-239,999 0.78% 0.00%
240,000-249,999 0.43% 0.00%
250,000-259,999 0.67% 0.01%
260,000-now 0.91% 0.01%
In this table we show that the wasted computational effort
in bitcoin has been marginal so far, and has even decreased
with time (mostly due to the work of Swiss researchers, see
[9], [10]). Moreover it is possible to see that the space for
the gain from the subversive strategy is even much smaller.
Let us explain this in detail. The only benefit we expect
from the “selfish strategy” of [12] is that subversive miners
will make other miners mine on blocks which later become
wasted blocks. More specifically, there is only one place where
the “selfish strategy” makes the honest majority of miners
lose something in proportion higher than for the subversive
“selfish” miners themselves. This is when the ordinary miners
are going to waste some of their computational effort on
producing what technically are children of wasted blocks in
the directed graph of all blocks ever mined. This is currently
only 0.01 % of miners’ combined effort (!).
In appearance this just confirms what the authors of [12]
have written: ”To the best of our knowledge, [...] pools (by
which they mean miners) [...] have been benign and followed
the protocol.” However we should think about it more than
once. It is obvious that, if the column 3 of our table has
to increase substantially in the future due to the adoption of
some subversive mining strategies, the column 2 also needs to
increase in a very substantial way (!). Then however, miners
will simply not accept to waste a lot of computational effort
and real money spent on electricity. It appears that Megawatts
are currently spent on bitcoin mining, see [15], [8]. Miners
will lobby to somewhat change the specification of bitcoin in
such a way that subversive strategies which make everybody
lose a large part of their effort are eliminated, or at least that
they remain as marginal as they currently are. For example
bitcoin might agree to penalize forks which will decrease the
benefits of subversive strategies which create more forks than
usual, such a countermeasure has been proposed in [2].
To summarize we believe that the claims of [12] are vastly
exaggerated and that it is rather a purely academic game theory
result of little practical importance. Selfish mining is probably
not the most practical of the subversive miner strategies which
we cover in the present paper. In one sense the paper [12] is
however very important: it gives an explicit recommandation
on how bitcoin miners should in the future select their blocks
on which they mine in a presence of a fork. They should do
it at random from all existing candidates and they should not
trust the timing of these blocks. This recommandation of [12]
allows to eliminate the selfish miner strategies in practice. It is
also expected to work against some other subversive strategies
such as the recent Block Discarding Attack of [2]. As such it
is likely to be implemented by bitcoin miners very soon.
VIII. A BLOCK DISCARDING ATTACK VS. SELFISH
MINING
The Block Discarding Attack is proposed in [2]. In fact
the paper [2] describes and studies a number of more or less
general subversive strategies, and the Selfish Mining attack of
[12] can be seen as the simplest and the most basic block
discarding attack which is called st1 in [2].
There is a number of differences in the approach, assump-
tions, analysis and claims in both papers (cf. Section 6.1.
in [2]). The original Selfish miners attacks is designed for
pools while the paper [2] explicitly discards this idea claiming
that it is very hard for pools to keep their blocks secret
and that the attack is meant to be executed by solo miners.
The Block Discarding Attack described in [2] have a variable
called ns which stands for “Network Superiority”. In [12] they
have a very similar concept: a propagation factor γ. A close
examination shows that both concepts are the same. In case
of a fork with two equivalent blocks A and B, the subversive
miners are trying to influence the honest miners to mine on
their branch A and not on B. The number γ or ns measures
the probability that honest miners mine on block A.
Another difference between two papers is that in [2] it
is not clear how this influence on the honest miners could
possibly be achieved. For example the attacker could be
somewhat able manipulate the network latency (or maybe
control more ordinary network nodes which are not miners). In
[12] it is postulated explicitly that this “capacity to influence”
can happen in a more “natural” way because miners will mine
on the block which they have received first in the network.
A. Comparison of Countermeasures
The two papers also differ by recommendations on how to
avoid the attack and on profitability when the countermeasures
are used. Following page 6 of [2] we learn that the st1 strategy
will be profitable if and only if the fraction of subversive min-
ers is at least 1−ns3−2ns . The same formula should therefore apply
to the selfish attack of [12]. The countermeasure suggested in
[12] is to mine at a random branch in presence of a fork. This
is equivalent to ns = 1/2. Then following the formula above
the attack is profitable if an only if the attacker has at least
25 % of the total hash power. On the other hand, the fork
punishment technique suggested in [2] does not try to change
the ns or γ but simply makes certain blocks be rewarded less
bitcoins. This countermeasure can be claimed to be better and
achieve a higher profitability threshold than 25 %, thus making
the selfish mining or similar attacks less likely to be executed.
With fork punishment, it is possible to see that the profitability
threshold is such that the attack is profitable only if the attacker
has nearly 50 % of the total hash power.
IX. A BLOCK WITHHOLDING ATTACK
In this paper we study yet another subversive strategy for
miners. We believe that it is at least as realistic as any other
subversive strategy proposed so far. A block withholding attack
was initially proposed by Rosenfeld in 2011, [24]. Later in
2013, in Section 7 entitled Related Work of [12] we read:
In a block withholding attack, a pool member decreases the
pool revenue by never publishing blocks it finds. In the earlier
paper [24] two distinct block withholding attack scenarios are
described in Section 6.2. They are called “Sabotage” and “Lie
in wait”. However the first attack does not give the rogue miner
any gain, it just makes everybody loose. As for the second
attack, it is a complex block concealing attack similar to the
Selfish miner strategy of [12] which we have criticized in this
paper as possibly being not very realistic or not very practical.
It should also be noted that block withholding attacks should
not be confused with the block discarding attack of [2], cf.
also Section VIII.
In what follows we are going describe a new sort of block
withholding attack which generalizes the “Sabotage” attack of
[24]. We show that it is possible for rogue miners to profit from
such an attack which was not the case with the original attack.
We describe a concrete practical instantiation and a concrete
numerical example of a block withholding attack together with
an analysis of possible variants. The basic version works as
follows:
1) We assume that all miners mine in pools, small and
large. Miners in one pool mine with the public key of
the pool manager which later re-distributes the gains.
2) We assume that the fees are very low. Moreover we
assume that miners do not change pools frequently
(cf. Pool Hopping attack [24], [25]) and that in the
long run, whatever is the reward method, they are
paid in proportion to their contribution. This is an
approximation, see [23], [22] for an overview of
reward policies of some existing pools.
3) We assume that there is a group of say α = 0.2 =
20% of rogue miners. We count 20 % in percentage of
the total computing power of the network measured
in hashes per second.
4) The rogue miners split in two groups of miners worth
α/2 = 10% each. Later in Section IX-B we show that
splitting in half is the optimal choice.
5) Half of the rogue miners representing α/2 of the total
computing power participate in all the other existing
pools in the bitcoin community. These “infiltrated
pools” jointly command the total computing power
of 1 − α/2 including α/2 of rogue miners. This is
done at random and in a distributed way, uniformly
in proportion to the respective computing powers of
these pools, and under changing identities, so that any
subversive activity remains unnoticed.
6) At the same time the rogue miners deploy their other
α/2 in their own minority pools which they control
and dominate (for example they create new small
pools which other miners are unable to join in time).
7) In each pool miners mine blocks for the pool manager
with the public key of the pool manager who controls
the payouts.
8) We assume that the pool managers are perfectly
neutral and do not try to detect or prevent any unusual
behavior.
9) We assume that in the static case and in the long
run, various pool miner reward methods [24], [25]
have essentially the same effect: they reward miners
essentially in proportion to their efforts. We also
neglect the pool fees and the timing of the payments,
cf. [22].
10) If miners find a share which has a hash with 32 zeros
and which is an undeniable proof of their effort, they
obtain a partial cash reward from the pool manager.
11) Miners always send their shares to the pool manager
as soon as possible.
12) If “normal” miners find a share with 64 zeros which
allows one to generate a whole new valid block for
the bitcoin network and which makes the pool win
25 BTC, [8], they send it to the pool manager.
13) Rogue miners behave differently: they drop it, and
do NOT report it to the pool manager. They basically
destroy (erase) this share which is worth a lot of
money to the the pool manager but nearly nothing
to them (they cannot benefit from the 25 BTC which
this block brings because they do not know the private
key known to the pool manager).
14) These events are very rare and happen 0 times for
the majority of honest miners, therefore the pool
managers cannot see if these blocks are not reported.
In larger pools pool managers might discover that
over the time they earn less money that expected
from their effort expended in the network, cf. Section
X-B, however they will never be able to know which
miners have cheated.
15) Rogue miners are nevertheless paid for all of their
efforts (the difference is negligible).
16) In our attack miners get paid for imitating honest
miners and sharing the reward obtained by others.
At the same time they mine for their own account
with half of their 20 % capacity. Here they behave
normally and do not waste any results.
17) Overall it is easy to see that the rogue miners get EX-
ACTLY the same monetary return on their computing
power contributed in public pools they have joined,
and a strictly higher return in their private new pools.
18) In the “infiltrated pools” the shares contributed are
equivalent to the actual computing power of 1−α/2
however the winning blocks are only generated by
the honest majority of 1 − α in the hashing power.
All the miners in the “infiltrated pools” will see their
monetary gains uniformly reduced by a factor of
1−α
1−α/2 =
80
90 ≈ 0.88.
19) Comparatively the other α/2 = 10% of rogue min-
ers’s capacity not involved in the well-known “infil-
trated” pools do get a higher reward NOT reduced by
the factor of 0.88 which makes it about 1− 1−α/21−α ≈
13 % higher in proportion.
20) Overall the rogue miners get paid a bigger share
than other miners and the difference is about 6% to
benefit the rogue miners. This is because only half
their mining capacity benefits from the 13 % higher
returns, more generally the gain can be computed as:
12
1− α/2
1− α +
1
2
− 1 = α
4(1− α)
With this attack the rogue miners obtain a share of reward
higher than their computing power contributed to the network
(which was also the main result of [12]). It is easy to see that
there is no easy way to stop this attack from happening.
A. Can Block Withholding Attacks Be Prevented?
Our attack shows that pools can function well only if the
pool manager can trust the pool participants. We do not know if
any of the current pools have implemented any countermeasure
against this attack. In [23] we read: “withholding of good
blocks by the clients is prevented by the server’s possession
of the private key”. This is simply not true. It is clear that this
does not prevent the attack in the slightest. It is more than
probable that the only reason why miners have been benign
and honest so far was that they ignored the existence of various
subversive strategies.
The only defense against this attack we can see is that pools
should involve ONLY people which we personally know and
trust, and the pool manager should simply dissolve and close a
pool as soon as he notices that it is earning less than expected
from its computational effort.
B. Alternative Versions and Optimizing the Attack
In another version of this attack rogue miners could be
total free riders: they could also just draw money from the
mining pools and never contribute anything. This is precisely
what is called “Sabotage” in [24]. However in this case they
would not obtain gains higher in proportion than their relative
computing power. In the attack we have described they do and
rogue miners spend half of their computing power on each
side. In fact it is easy to show that this the optimal choice.
More generally by redoing the same analysis in the general
case we obtain immediately that:
Theorem 4 (Generalized Attack Analysis): If the propor-
tion of rogue miners is α and if a proportion of αβ infiltrates
the pools and discards the winning blocks, while the other
α(1− β) mine normally in a small independent pools, then a
part of rogue miners are paid more than the other miners by
the factor of 1−α(1−β)1−α and overall their relative gain is equal
to:
(1− β)1− α(1− β)
1− α + β − 1 =
αβ(1− β)
1− α .
Moreover for any given fixed α the gain of the rogue miners
is maximized when β = 1/2.
X. DETECTION AND PREDICTED IMPACT OF THE BLOCK
WITHHOLDING ATTACK
In this section we first explain some facts about existing
mining pools, large and small. Then we are going to apply our
Theorem 2 to some miners, and see what it implies for them
in practice.
In Table II we see that bitcoin can hardly be called a
decentralized currency. On the contrary in January 2014 just
TABLE II. SOME EXISTING POOLS IN PERCENTAGE OF THEIR
HASHING POWER RELATIVE TO THE WHOLE BITCOIN NETWORK
pool percentage
BTCGuild.com 26%
GHash.io 40%
Eligius.st 10%
Bitcoin.cz 6%
Bitminter.com 5%
one single company based in Ukraine has been dangerously
approaching the barrier of 50 %, see [4]).
Now we are going to show that our attack also can
contribute to centralization: it implies a minimal size for pools
below which the attack will not be detected.
A. Detection of Block Withholding
Now armed with Theorem 2 we are going to show that for
an individual miner the attack is not visible. We will look at
the blocks mined by one single miner.
We have selected one miner at random and have observed
his whole history which spans a period of 1 year. This miner
has mined K = 18 blocks in one year under one single public
key. Now following Theorem 2, if one pool has produced just
about 18 valid blocks in a year, the standard deviation will
be about
√
K =
√
18 ≈ 4.2, which is about 24 % of the
number K. Now because due to Theorem 1 the distribution is
a Gaussian, we know that any difference between our model
and the reality which is about 24 % is going to happen with
very high probability close to 1, see [19]. In other words this
miner cannot detect rogue miner groups as large as 20 %
(achieving a 6 % competitive advantage) such as described in
our attack. This is simply because any observable difference
will be way below the standard deviation which was estimated
to be about 24 %. This miner cannot possibly detect the block
withholding attack described in this paper.
Remark 1. The same result holds for the majority of
existing miners with exception of very large miners. For a
miner to mine K = 18 blocks in one year is already quite
rare. A quick estimation shows that an average miner mines
less than one block per year: BTCGuild reports a population
of some 27,000 active online miners and has a capacity to
produce about 13,000 blocks per year.
Remark 2. We can observe that the bitcoin mining events
which occur every 10 minutes are not frequent enough for
individual miners to detect rogue mining activity in practice. If
bitcoin was re-designed in such a way that the mining events
were more frequent, for example one event every second, then
in proportion the standard deviation would be roughly
√
600 ≈
24 times smaller for any miner or group. This would mean that
the thresholds at which rogue activity could be detected by
miners would be roughly also about 24 times smaller. However
for the time being individual bitcoin miners just cannot detect
these important and realistic attacks, not even in theory.
Remark 3. If all bitcoin miners in existence published their
detailed mining stats and their exact numbers of trials, rogue
miner strategies would be detected more easily and with better
precision. Large mining pools will be large enough to detect
the attack. However the miners must trust the pool to detect
the attack and to report the statistical data accurately. Mining
pools could have an interest in concealing the existence of the
attack. Maybe because some strategies against Pool Hopping
attacks [24], [25] involve concealing information about the
mining process. More importantly, in order to avoid users from
switching to another pool which could be in some cases more
harmful than the actual attack (in both cases the pool income
would decrease).
B. Have Rogue Strategies Been Applied?
We have looked at public stats presented by the second
largest pool in existence, BTCGuild.com. Have block with-
holding already been done? In order to see this we have
multiplied the currency difficulty level by the overall Pay
Per Share rate displayed by BtcGuild.com on 05/01/2014. We
obtain.
1418481395 ∗ 0.0000000163026460 = 23.125
The result should be at least 25 bitcoins plus transaction
fees, minus 5+3 % pool fees which are kept by this pool
according to [22]. This should be at least 23 BTC plus some
0.1-0.2 BTC due to typical transaction fees. This is more or
less what we obtain.
We have also looked at some individual miners. Only for
very large miners we can expect to see anything, cf. Thm. 2.
The biggest individual miner 269032 had the hashing power
of 174 TH/s on 01/01/2014. A quick calculation shows that
he should produce 2.5 blocks/day on average. In five days this
will be some 12.5 blocks on average with a standard deviation
of about 3.5 cf. Thm. 2. We have observed in the public stats
that this user has produced 16 blocks in the first 5 days of
2014 and 10 blocks in the following 5 days. These figures fit
perfectly within the standard deviation interval.
Overall we conclude that there is no evidence that rogue
miner strategies have ever been applied.
LATEST NEWS 13 JUNE 2014: It seems that a block
withholding attack was executed in practice against Eligius
mining pool, see Section XI-A.
Earlier attacks against 50 BTC: There were also earlier
reports of suspected block withholding by an ’evilpool’ acting
as a proxy to connect to 50BTC mining pool in late 2013, cf.
[5], in which the ’evilpool’ would send to 50BTC pool ”all
shares except of winning ones”, see [5].
XI. CONCLUSION
Bitcoin digital currency is a sort of distributed electronic
notary system. It is used to make payments with units called
bitcoins. It has a public ledger of all transactions which is
used to record all events in which money circulates between
different participants identified by their cryptographic keys.
Bitcoin miners are the key people which support this digital
currency by participating in a sort of lottery which attributes
important monetary rewards to them. Their activity has sub-
stantial computational cost which is the main thing which
makes it difficult for the attacker to modify the common history
of monetary transactions. In this paper we look at the question
of subversive strategies for miners in which they deviate from
the expected “honest” behavior. We survey recent results and
propose new attacks.
Bitcoin cultivates this “impossible” cryptographers’ dream
of building a payment system without any trusted parties. In
theory bitcoin is a network which is expected to police itself.
For example miners not following the protocol risk that their
blocks will be later rejected be the majority of other network
participants and they will not receive the reward which usually
motivates them to support this digital currency. In practice
however as we show in this paper, not every rogue behavior
is detectable. If a certain form of unwanted behavior is not
visible, it can hardly be policed or prevented.
In this paper we looked at a number of different methods
by which some participants in the bitcoin digital currency can
hope to increase their gains at the expense of others. Several
such attacks have been proposed in the past [16], [24], [25],
[2]. Many more such attacks can be proposed, for example any
non-trivial cryptographic optimisation in the bitcoin mining
process could be kept confidential by a group of miners, cf.
Section VI. A very recent method is the so called selfish miner
strategy from [12] which was also independently proposed in
[2]. In this paper we question the assumptions of [12] and
we have come to a temporary conclusion that this strategy is
unlikely to make any difference in practice because it depends
on events in the bitcoin network are visible and which have
been historically excessively rare. As such they are unlikely to
substantially increase in the future. For example because one
method to reform the behavior of miners was precisely already
proposed in [12] and a method to discourage forks have been
proposed in [2].
Another major idea which was already proposed in the past
are subversive strategies which involve block withholding [24],
[12]. In this paper we have described and analyzed a specific
practical block withholding attack which to the best of our
knowledge is a new and original block withholding attack.
It generalizes the “Sabotage” attack of [24] and achieves
superior gains for the subversive miners. The two main results
of [12] are as follows. (1) to design an attack in which
the rogue miners will obtain gains which in proportion to
their contributed computing power will be higher than for the
honest majority, and (2) to show that this creates substantial
incentives for greater centralization in the bitcoin network
which is somewhat contrary to the whole idea of bitcoin.
In this paper we also achieve (1) and (2) by a different and
independent method. Moreover we show that our strategy can
tolerate a substantial percentage of miners engaged in it, for
example as big as 20 %, this without being detected by small
pools or individual miners. In contrast the so called selfish
miner strategy of [12] depends on events in bitcoin history
(forks) which are always visible and can hardly be ignored.
In comparison we claim that the block withholding attacks
are impossible to avoid otherwise than by trusting the miners
who participate in pools which is disturbing knowing that
bitcoin was designed to precisely avoid trusting other network
participants. The only defense against this attack we can see is
that pools should involve ONLY people which they personally
know and trust, and the pool manager should simply dissolve
and close a pool as soon as he notices that it is earning less
than expected from its computational effort. This leads to a
postulate that pools should not be too large. On the other hand,
pools cannot be too small, otherwise miners will cheat without
being detected, due to Thm. 2.
In practice it is well known that there are strong incentives
for miners to “flock to the biggest pools” [25]. Contrary to the
popular wisdom, bitcoin is not really decentralized. Bitcoin
mining is very highly centralized and recently one pool was
approaching the half of the computing power in the bitcoin
network, cf. Table II. This is a big problem and it contradicts
the original idea of bitcoin as a decentralized currency [18].
In this paper we provide additional reasons for miners to
avoid small pools and provide another plausible explanation
why such a high concentration of hashing power is natural
and very hard to avoid. We postulate that the subversive
mining strategies might in the future play a positive role in the
bitcoin network: they might lead to miners avoiding large pools
because it will be shown that these pools contain subversive
miners earning more than their fair share. At this moment in
history there is no evidence of any rogue miner behavior. Yet
people mine in excessively large “monopoly” pools even when
they have very high fees as big as 8 %, see Section X-B. This
shows that various recent results about optimal strategies in
bitcoin network remain very academic. Many people will just
not change their behavior in order to achieve a gain of a few
percent.
A. Recent Developments - June 2014
Early reports of suspected block withholding attacks go
back to late 2013, cf. [5] and Section X-B.
On 13 June 2014 it was reported that a large-scale block-
withholding attack as described in this paper (or a variant)
was executed against the mining pool Eligius, see https:
//bitcointalk.org/?topic=441465.msg7282674. Losses are very
substantial and were estimated to be about 300 BTC at the
expense of honest miners, The pool has been able to detect the
attack and was able to block 200 BTC worth of the attackers
payouts’ which from the point of view of Eligius were as
good as stealing 200 bitcoins earned by the honest miners.
The attackers have in retaliation ”threatened putting a 200 BTC
bounty on hacking Eligius”.
In the same blog post we read: ”the attacker does not gain
any direct benefit by performing the attack”. This reflects
the general lack of understanding of such attacks in the bitcoin
community. Also the Cornell researchers have claimed it is
NOT profitable: ”Note that the attacker doesn’t gain anything
from this behavior, either; it’s purely destructive”, see [13].
In this paper we show that this attack CAN be
profitable and we believe that the attack executed against
Eligius was run in such a way as to be profitable, possibly
exactly as described in this paper. This is likely to be true
given the fact that the variant we describe in this paper was
optimized to maximize the profitability.
Recent Developments: A new paper takes block with-
holding attacks to the new level [14] (26 November 2014).
This recent work is build upon one of the key observations
in the present paper, which is that miners can withhold block
selectively in some pools, and mine normally in other pools.
This is exactly what can make the block withholding attacks
eventually profitable (cf. our present paper) and not just
”purely destructive” cf. [13]. However these attacks are really
profitable mainly if one miner executes them, and other miners
don’t. The new paper considers further more complex scenarios
where several miners are trying to cheat simultaneously, which
decreases the incentives for the attack and potentially might
convince the miners to be honest.
The new paper also claims that this ”would push miners to
join private pools which can verify that their registered miners
do not withhold blocks”. This is not very likely. No pools
can detect the attack if it is done correctly. We recall that
block withholding attacks are very hard to detect cf. Section
IV-B unless the attacker is not very careful and mines large
quantities of bitcoins under the same address, cf. Section X-B.
The attacker can easily execute a block withholding attack
against any set of pools in such a way that the pools will not
be able to incriminate a single address which belongs to the
attacker, for this it is sufficient to fragment the attack and mine
under many different identities.
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APPENDIX
XII. THE GOOD AND THE UGLY: SUBVERSIVE
STRATEGIES FOR ASIC MANUFACTURERS
In bitcoin network there exists a threat which is far bigger
than some malicious miners and centrally managed mining
pools. In this paper we have seen that bitcoin mining is
surprisingly centralized instead of being decentralized, cf.
Table II. In this section we look at the problems of trust and
risk of fraud which result from the highly centralized supply
of mining devices.
In 2012-2013 a new powerful group of people have
emerged in the bitcoin currency: ASIC miner chip manufac-
turers. A dozen of companies which offer fast specialized ICs
for bitcoin mining. These devices achieve power consumption
which is up to 10,000 times smaller than what can be achieved
with ordinary computers cf. [8]. At this moment bitcoin has
totally lost whatever remained from a peer-to-peer utopia
without trusted parties. A dozen of companies control 100
% of bitcoin mining devices market. These companies are
the lifeblood of the bitcoin currency. They must be trusted
and trustworthy for bitcoin to function. They take pre-orders
and manipulate tens of millions of dollars of other people’s
money. Unhappily these companies are subject to important
moral hazards as we will see below.
In the traditional financial sector, companies which might
be tempted to misbehave are strictly controlled and regulated
by the governments. In bitcoin we have a unique situation
where these companies function as ordinary businesses which
is very unusual. In this respect bitcoin is not like other
currencies. We live in a society of excessive asymmetry of
information between the public and the private sector. It is
very easy to get information about actions of governments and
politicians, and it is very common to criticize their actions.
In the recent years it also became possible to criticize the
government secret services such as the NSA, and since the
financial crisis of 2008 it became very common to publicly
ostracize banks and financial institutions. However it is very
rare and quite difficult to criticize private business. Firstly
this is because it is extremely difficult to get accurate data
on their actions. Secondly almost nobody ever does it fearing
legal proceedings. However this should not stop researchers
from investigating these questions. Security researchers need
to study all sort of threats to the secure systems and many
issues should be discussed publicly if we want the security
to improve. A market economy cannot function properly
if customers cannot know what kind of company they are
ordering things from.
Below we give a short summary of dirty tricks which ASIC
manufacturer companies could be tempted to execute on their
customers. It is not our role to accuse any of these companies.
Moderate delays in delivery are not surprising for a new ASIC,
and we believe that most of these companies are honest, hard
working and ethical businesses. Cf. 2 3 4. The competition
between these companies have recently become quite fierce
2 We have however observed that the Internet is full of reports of angry
customers of the US company ButterFly Labs, which has excessively bad
reputation and has fallen very badly below customer expectations with delivery
delays as long as 1 year.
and hopefully this creates strong incentives to behave well.
However. When miners invest money in order to support a
digital currency they must be aware of the risks. Here are the
principal threats and attacks we have identified:
1) Non-existent Production Attack: The miners ad-
vertise and sell mining devices which do not exist.
Payment is done in bitcoins only (bad sign). Cf. 3 4.
2) Fake Retailer Attack: Devices are sold by a third-
party retailer which does not deliver miners to cus-
tomers, just collects the money. Cf. 4.
3) Secret Production Attack: ASIC manufacturers con-
ceal how many devices have been ordered in order to
make miners believe that mining will be profitable,
which allows to sell even more such devices.
4) Device Hoarding Attack: The ASIC manufacturer
delays shipping the device for a very long time like
1 year without a reason. He uses the device to mine
bitcoins and makes a lot of money at the expense of
a naive customer.
5) Power Consumption Attack: The ASIC manufac-
turer advertises a power consumption of 1 W per
Gigahash/s and is so confident about achieving this
target that he offers to pay a very large lump sum of
money to charity if they miss this target by more
than 10 %. Many people order these devices and
the ASIC company is able to capture a lot of cash
from miners worldwide. Later customers will receive
devices which consume 3.2 Watts per Gigahash/s.
All is blamed on technical problems and lack of
experience of the manufacturer. In fact it could have
been a deliberate strategy to get more orders.
6) Device Substitution Attack: The ASIC manufacturer
remains very vague on specifications of their devices,
and never specifies the power consumption in the
commercial material. Then he ships inferior products
to most customers.
7) Device Backdoor Attack: The ASIC manufacturer
ships devices with nominal power of 3.2 W however
they are able to manufacture an IC consuming 1 W.
The remaining 2.2 W are spent on a hidden func-
tionality: mining for the rogue manufacturer. Only
when a block is found the backdoor functionality
must communicate with the manufacturer. This s a
very rare event and the fraud remains undetected.
The ASIC company is able to mine bitcoins in vast
quantities with both hardware and electricity being
paid by naive miners, and this without being detected.
In addition the ASIC manufacturer can implement
anti-reverse engineering countermeasures which are
well known in the silicon industry, to avoid the fraud
from being detected.
8) Mafia Lottery Attack: The ASIC manufacturer an-
nounces that customers which are going to receive
devices first are going to be selected by a lottery. This
can be seen as either a really brilliant method to boost
3 Some companies are clearly fake and do not exist, for example www.
hashblaster.com and www.xtrememiners.net. They are just criminals who
take the money and provide nothing in return.
4 There is a web site which reports all sort of bitcoin fraudulent ac-
tivity: http://bitcoinscammers.com such as fake miner stores, for example
minerstore.net and ctsminer.com etc. are all scams.
sales or a dubious and rather terribly immoral policy,
this depending on the point of view. It is 1) a slap
in the face of customers who paid earlier and 2) an
incitation for even more customers to order devices,
because they have some chance to obtain them at
the expense of customers who paid earlier. Now here
is what is (potentially) going on behind the scenes.
We describe just one of a few possible subversive
scenarios. In addition to the official market far selling
ASIC devices, there is another parallel market where
people can buy something else for example shares of
some company or hosted mining services. However
in fact the lottery is rigged, and the second market
functions as a method to collect kickbacks for the first
market, while the first market allows to artificially
inflate assets on the second market. The company
makes a lot of money on both markets and at the same
time they claim that they are doing nothing wrong.
In fact the fact alone of using a lottery should be a
warning sign.
